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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

··-.......___

I

--.....
1!~:---!t

ANDREW G. NOKES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.CONTINENTAL MINING & MILLING
CO., a Corpor.ation, E. G. FRAWLEY,
President, JOHN DOE, Secretary, GLEN"
I. CRANDALL, Transfer Agent,
Defendants and Appellants.

Case No.
8501

Brief of Respondent
'i~. ),j2j,

STATE~1ENT

OF THE FACTS

THE STA'TEMENT OF FACTS CONTAINED IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF ARE NOT ENTIRELY CORRECT AND,
THEREFORE, RESPONDENT WILL SET FORTH HIS
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND THEREAFTER NOTE THE
POINTS OF SUBSTANTIAL DISAGREEMENT.

Plaintiff, .a resident of Kansas at the time the purchase of the stock was made, was in Salt Lake Cit~,,
rtah, as a witness in certain condemnation actions involving Pioneer Pipe Line Company, his employer. Pioneer Pipe Line Company was represented hy Messrs.
1
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Lowe and Cuthbert (R. 34,44) and, therefore, plaintiff
had been interviewed by and was acquainted with Messrs.
Lowe and Cuthbert. At the time the stock transfer was
negotiated in June, 1954, the uranium boom was at its
height (R. 45) and the plaintiff who had previously purchased uranium stocks through a discretionary account
of J. A. Hogle Company (R. 45) advised :Messrs. Lowe
and Cuthbert of the fact that he would like to make additional speculations (R. 46).
~Ir. Cuthbert on the n1orning of June 16, 1954, informed plaintiff that he knew a party who had stock in
the defendant corporation and that such party might be
willing to sell this stock (R. -!:5). Plaintiff knew nothing
of the defendant corporation and Messrs. Lowe and Cuthbert advised him that it was an .affiliate of Consolidated
G" ranium :\lines, Inc., and that the stock was not traded
nor wa~ there any established n1arket, over-the-counter
or otherwise (R. -!:5 ). :\Ir. Cuthbert explained to the
plaintiff that although there was no n1arket for the stock
he understood that a portion of its assets consisted of a
block of stock of another ur.aniun1 cmnpany. which on the
ha~i::; of enrrent market prices, w·ould giYe a book value
of $6,000.00 to $7,000.00 for 100,000 shares of the defendant corporation (H. -l-;) ). Plaintiff "~as further advised
that it n1ight tak(' a considerable length of tilue, perhaps
<'VPn dissolution of the corporation, before he would
n'<·ein' an~· rdurn for nwney invested (R. -!:5). Plaintiff
inl'ontwd .:\l(·s~rs. Cuthbert and Lowe that he would inV<'st approximately $500.00 in the stork (R. 34,46,54:).
l\1 r. Cuthbert then c.alled !Ir. l\rigliareio. the owner of the

2
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stock, and arranged a ti1ne and place for the negotiation
for the sale of the stock.
It is interesting to note that the plaintiff brought up
the subject of uranium speculation in the conversations
at the offices of Messrs. Lowe and Cuthbert and also
suggested the price to be paid for the stock (R. 35) .and
that other stocks were mentioned (R. 36). The actual
negotiations and consummation of the sale of the stock
occurred in the Atlas Building and out of the presence of
both 2\[r. Cuthbert and Mr. Lowe (R. 38). The plaintiff
had no knowledge of any infirmity in the stock certificate
or its ownership at the time he made the purchase of the
stock (R. 30). The stock certificate was complete and
regular on its face, properly endorsed with endorsement
guaranteed and Federal Revenue Stamps attached (Ex.
1).
On the 18th day of June, 1954, plaintiff presented the
certificate to the president of defendant corporation,
E. G. Frawley, and requested transfer of the stock on the
books of the corporation (R. 6,12,19). This request was
refused (R. 7,12). Again on June 19, 1954, plaintiff demanded the corporation to transfer the stock to him and
was again refused (R. 6,7,12). Thereafter, on August
2, 1954, counsel for plaintiff by letter addressed to the
secretary of defendant corporation again demanded
transfer of the stock to plaintiff and was again refused
(R. 7,12). At the time of each of these demands there
was no transfer agent for the corporation (R. 5,11).
'l,he demand for transfer was made at the office of the
corporation (R. 6,12).
3
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After the defendant had refused to transfer the subject certificate, plaintiff contacted Messrs. Lowe and
Cuthbert who informed him that there had been a contest
over the right to the certificate in the Utah State Securities Commission but that the seller, :Mr. Migliaccio, had
been successful in such action and the certificate had
been turned over to him (R. 41, Line 15). ~Ir. Cuthbert
in fact stated that he felt that the matter of dispute had
been satisfied by the Attorney General's opinion (R. 46,
Line 23 ; R. 49, Line 1). In fact, it was his belief that
the personal animosity existing between Mr. Frawley,
president of Continental ~lining & :Milling Co., and Mr.
J\1:igliaccio would not carry over to a third party owner
(R. 49).
M:r. Frawley was president of Continental Mining
& Milling Co. (R. 60) and w.as well acquainted with the
affairs of the corporation (R. 60,61) and knew the value
of the stock of such cmnpany (R. 61, Lines 5, 6, 7) and
that as of October 7, 1954, (R. 66, Lines 26,27,28) the
stock was worth $4,000.00 ( R. Gi, Lines 22,23,2±,25) and
that at present it has no value or n1arket (R. 63, Lines
10,11,12,13,14,15).
Although in the opinion of plaintiff 1natters which
oceurred prior to or subsequent to the tr.ansfer of the
stock rerti fieatt> are innnaterial and irrelevant unless
shown to have been conununicated to the plaintiff, the
<ki'Pndnnt has placed such e1nphasis on certain of these
eiremn~tmwt'~ that an outline of the events would seem
propPr. Frmn 1950 to the tilne of connnence1nent of this
action, La\\Tenep .2\1 igliaceio and defendants Continental
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Mining and Milling Company and E. G. Frawley were
involved in practically continuous litigation on various
matters (R. 48,49). There developed a great deal of animosity between Nir. Frawley and Mr. 1iigliaccio (R. 49).
In this connection, .a controversy developed between them
over the release of 100,000 shares of stock in defendant
corporation by the Utah State Securities Commission.
The stock was released to the ~Iigliaccios following an
Attorney General's opinion directing its release to Mr.
Migliaccio and his wife (R. 41,46,51,52). John W. Lowe
and Thomas C. Cuthbert had represented the Migliaccios
as attorneys in these matters (R. 46, 51). On June 11,
1954, Continental Mining and l\Iilling Company filed a
complaint in the Federal District Court against the seller of the stock certificate, 11igliaccio, but the said Migliaccio had not been served with summons and, in fact, the
filing of the complaint was unknown to the plaintiff or
any of the interested parties or witnesses in this action
at the time the sale was consummated (R. 30,50,53).
Plaintiff was not a party to the action instituted by the
defendant company and there was no adjudication of
plaintiff's rights in that action, his rights being specifically excluded from the court's determination (Defendants' Exs. 3,4).
PLAINTIFF TAKES ISSUE WITH THE FOLLOWING
ST A:TEMEN'TS OF FACT AS CONTAINED IN APPELLANTS' BRIEF:

1. (B.2) "The transfer of the stock was arranged
for the specific purpose of defeating the corporation's
rights and under such circumstances that dispel any no-

5
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tion of a transfer in good faith." There is contained in
the record no evidence whatsoever as to the purpose of
the transfer except that plaintiff expected financial gain.
2. (B.2) " ... Cuthbert .and Lowe were present
and represented Migliaccio, ... and were advised that the
corporation intended to institute an action to recover
the certificate." The evidence shows that Mr. Lowe was
present but there is nothing in the record to indicate ~1r.
Cuthbert was also present (R. 51). Further, the statement that ~Ir. Cuthbert was advised that the corporation
intended to institute an action to recover the certificate
is incorrect, :Jir. Cuthbert's testimony being that he
thought the matter had been settled by the Attorney
General's opinion and did not know of the pendency of
any suit (R. 46,50).
3. (B.3) "l\1r. Lowe knew that the action had been
cmnn1enced." This state1nent is incorrect, the only testimony being that l\Ir. Lowe had been advised by counsel
for appellants at the ti1ne the stock was released by the
Securities Couunission that appellants threatened to comInence a lawsuit (R. 53).

+.

(B.3) "Cuthbert knew Xokes was a novice and
lacking in any knowledge about uranium stock, except
that he had heard there was money to be n1ade in uranilllll ~toek." ':rhe evidence sho"·s that :Jfr. Xokes had been
di~eu~~ing the uraniu1n 1narket practically daily before
the pnreha~P and that he had bought smne stocks through
a di~erd.ionary account with J. A. Hogle & Company.
6
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His lack of knowledge was as to the boom in the uranium
stock market prior to arriving here (R. 36,45).
5. (B.3) " ... the price .at which it could be purchased was made by Cuthbert and Lowe." The evidence
is that the price was set by :Mr. Nokes stating that he
had $500.00 to invest (R. 35,37,46 and 54).
6. (B.4) " ... it took a United States Marshal
from the 11th day of June until the 19th day of July to
discover the whereabouts of Mr. and Mrs. Migliaccio .
. . ." At no place in the record is there anything suggesting how long it took the :Marshal to serve Mr. Migliaccio,
the only evidence being that ~Ir. Migliaccio had not been
served at the time the sale of the stock to Mr. Nokes took
place (R. 50).
7. (B.4,5) Appellants' brief states that Mr. Cuthbert forgot to telll\Ir. Nokes the substance of the conversation he had with Migliaccio. Mr. Cuthbert's testimony
on cross-examination explains that the conversation he
had with :Migliaccio was to the fact that the Migliaccios
probably could not obtain a transfer of the stock without
litigation and was based upon the animosity between Mr.
Migliaccio and l\Ir. Frawley, president of the company,
and had nothing to do with any belief that there was any
legal impedirnent to the transfer of the stock and that,
therefore, that portion of the conversation was not related to Mr. Nokes (R. 49).
8. (B.5) "In about an hour's time all of these matters occurred and Nokes hurried to meet l\1:igliaccio, turn

7
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over to him a month's salary, before deductions, and went
to an office of the defendant Frawley to demand transfer." The record on page 6 contains a request for admissions wherein in paragraph 2C there is a request for admission that demands for transfer were made on the corporation on June 18, 19 and August 2, 1954. This request
for admission is admitted by defendants in paragraph 5
of their answers to request for admissions (R. 12). The
"hour's time" is therefore enlarged to two days.
9. (B.5) •· . . . Cuthbert and Lowe told Nokes that
the defendant corporation claimed the stock." The record
discloses that in reply to ~lr. X oke's question he was
informed that although the defendant corporation had
resisted the release of the stock at the Securities Commission, it had failed in its efforts and the stock had been
delivered to plaintiff's seller.
10. (B.6) '' . . . Federal Court . . . adjudicated
that the corporation was the owner of the stock." The
decree in the Federal action only adjudicates that the
corporation's right is paran1ount to the right of the
l\ligliaccios or that of any persons claiming under them
with notice or without value (Ex. -1-, R. 42).
11. (B.G) ~tatt•s that the record does not show
that the stock wa~ sent to the transfer agent of the corporation for transfer. The record on page 5 discloses interrogatories to the part~· wherein at interrogatory 1, defendant is asked who the transfer agent of the corporation wa~ on the dates dmnand for transfer was n1ade.
The an~\n'rs to the interrogatory disclose that there was

8

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

j

no transfer agent on any of the dates the demands for
transfer were made (R. 11).
The respondent contends that the decision of the
trial court in this action in finding that plaintiff was a
bona fide purchaser for value without notice of any infirmity in the stock certificate of the defendant corporation and that he is entitled to a transfer thereof on the
books of the corporation was proper and the only
decision that could be made by the court in view of the
evidence offered by plaintiff and defendant as to which
there is no substantial disagreement. Further, the evidence warrants a judgment for damages to the plaintiff
in the sum of $4,000.00.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY THE DECISION IN
THE CASE OF CONTINENTAL MINING & MILLING CO. vs.
LAWRENCE AND MARIE 0. MIGLIACCIO.

POINT II.
PLAINTIFF IS A BON A FIDE PURCHASER OF THE
STOCK FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY
INFIRMITY IN HIS TRANSFEROR'S TITLE.

POINT III.
PLAINTIFF BY THE PURCHASE OF THE STOCK ACQUIRED AN INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO THE SHARES
REPRESENTED BY THE CERTIFICATE.

POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES.

9
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
PLAINTIFF IS NOT BOUND BY THE DECISION IN
THE CASE OF CONTINENTAL MINING & MILLING CO. vs.
LAWRENCE AND MARIE 0. MIGLIACCIO.

The Federal District Court in the case of Continental ~fining & Milling Co., plaintiff, vs. Lawrence and
~Iarie 0. ~1:igliaccio, defendants, Civil C-85-54, United
States District Court for the District of rtah, specifically excluded from its decree any determination of the
rights of any person who claimed the certificate without
notice of infirmity or who had paid value therefor.
The Utah Supre1ne Court in Adams 'C. Sih·er Shield
Jl1iuing & 1llilling Company, 21 P. 2d 886, held that the
conuuence1nent of a suit did not affect the rights of the
parties in a transfer of stock. In that case a husband got
an option to purchase stock from another and a delivery
of the stock certificate was Inade to him. The option was
not exercised but in a divorce proceeding he gave the
stock to his wife, the plaintiff in the action. Plaintiff
argued that since no action had been connnenced against
her husband before the transfer, she becmne the absolute
owner of the stock although she gaye no consideration for
t lw tr.ansfer. On this proposition, this court said:
"Respondent argues that Section 6 of the act
nmkes the Plaintiff the absolute owner of the
sto<'k and that it was incu1ubent on the Defendant
under ~Petion 7 to eommenee an action for repossession of the stoek before it was transferred
to Plaintiff even if without consideration. This

10
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would make the rights of the p.arties depend entirely upon whether or not an action to recover
the stock has been commenced at the time of the
transfer and not on the equitable doctrine of estoppel. In other words, if the rights of the parties
were solely to be determined on whether or not
a suit has been commenced under Section 7 of the
act prior to the transfer, then it would not make
any difference whether the transferee was .a purchaser for value or took with full notice of facts
that the transfer was wrongful and the transfer
would be final. We do not believe the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act was intended to make any
such change in the law."
The cases cited by appellants on the point of res
judicata deserve a word of explanation. Mat hews v.
Mathews, 102 Utah 428, 132 P. 2d 111, was a case involving the same p.arties and issues as in two previous cases
decided adverse to plaintiff, and the court correctly ruled
that these two previous decisions barred plaintiff's efforts in a third case on the smne matter. The case of
Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P. 2d 957, held that
the right of persons who were parties to a water hearing
but whose rights had not been fully determined in that
hearing were not bound by a reversal of the State Engineer's order rejecting plaintiff's application to appropriate water. In neither of these cases was there involved a
question of transferee's rights, nor the question of the
rights of bona fide purchasers without notice.
The Fnifonn Stock Transfer Act adopts the common law principal of estoppel of a person to assert the
invalidity of another's title.
11
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In this case, there is no contention made by appellants that the stock represented an overissue or was issued in violation of any provision of the articles or bylaws of the corporation. The complaint filed in the
United States District Court (Ex. 3) shows that the stock
was issued to the Migliaccios pursuant to a lease and option to purchase mining claims, and that appellants' right
to recover the stock arose out of appellants failing to pay
the Migliaccio's $5,000.00 and failing to take possession
of the mining claims on or before April30, 1950.
Defendant corporation issued a stock certificate in
the name of the Migliaccios in February of 1950. This
certificate was regular on its face and imparted a representation of the corporation to anyone seeing it that the
~Iigliaccios owned the shares represented by the certificate. Thereafter, in 1950, the corporation rescinded
the lease and option agreement which gave rise to the
issuance of the stock, and connnenced an action for its
rescission in the Fnited States District Court and prayed
return of the amounts advanced to the :Jligliaccios. This
case went to the lOth Circuit Court of Appeals and is reported a~ J/ igl iaccio r. Continental JI in ing & IJ!illing
C<Jm Jmll.1f, 196 F. ~d. 395. At no point in this litigation did
defendant~ seek to obtain the subject stock certificates,
wll i<'h tlH~~· knew would lead a prospective purchaser
to rPiy on l\1 igl iaeeio ·~ owner~hip of the shares in the
<'o rpo rat ion. Defendants, E'Yl~n though the certificate had
lH'Pll outstanding OY<'r four years, took no steps to obtain
a cancellation of tlw ~toek or court order directing the
e<>rti fi<'atc to be delivered to the corporation for cancella-

12
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tion until the stock certificate was released by the Utah
Securities Commission, even though ~the corporation believed that :Migliaccio was seeking the stock so he could
sell it (Ex. 3, Par. 9). This conduct estops the defendants from asserting the invalidity of the stock purchased
by plaintiff.
In 2 Pomeroy's Equity Juris prudence, Fifth Edition,
page 1010ff, Section 710, there is a discussion of the general proposition of estoppel in relation to priorities of
assignments. This discussion gives a good background
of the law prior to the enactment of the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act and in Section 710 (b) this act is specific.ally
treated. 18 C.J.S. p. 641-2, Sec. 207; 13 Am. Jur. 417,
Sec. 345; 13 Am. Jur. p. 419, Sec. 347; 11 Fletcher Cyclo.
Corporations, Perm. Ed., p. 362, Sec. 5169.
11 Fletcher Cyclo. Corporations, Perm. Ed., p. 359,
Sec. 5168 states:
"Sec. 5168. CERTIFICATE AS REPRESENTATION OF VALIDITY, OWNERSHIP
AND POWER TO CONVEY.
''A certificate of stock issued by a corporation having power under its charter to issue certificates in the form in which such certificate is
issued, is a continuing affirmation or representation th.at the stock therein described is valid and
genuine, and that the person therein named is the
owner of the stock represented thereby and has
the capacity to transfer the same. Such statements and representations are made for the express purpose of inducing, and with the expectation that they will induce, strangers to purchase
the stock .and the certificate, and address them13
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selves to whoever thereafter acquires the certificates. And subsequent purchasers or pledgees
of the stock have a right to rely upon them, regardless of the nmnber of transfers that may have
been made in the meantime, unless they have actual notice of the invalidity of the certificate, or
the circumstances are such as to create suspicion,
and put a reasonably prudent man upon inquiry.
"It follows that the corporation is liable in
damages to bona fide purchasers or pledgees of
fictitious or unauthorized certificates who are deceived and injured by relying upon their genuineness, provided they were issued by an officer or
agent of the corporation acting within the apparent scope of his authority. And it also follows
that, as against such a purchaser or pledgee, the
corporation is estopped to deny that the person
named in the certificate is the owner of the stock
represented by it, or to deny the validity of the
stock represented by the certificate, provided it
has authority and power to issue stock of the
kind .and character in question.''
The Ctah Supre1ne Court in the case of Commercial
J:a,!l,· of SjJallish Fork r. 8JWllish Fork South Irrigation
Co., 101 C tah :21!), 153 P. :2d 547. adopts the principles
a hov<> ~d forth in an action for dmnages involving an
ovPr-i~~ll<' of water stock. A-\s stated above, the stock
which i~ th<-' suhjed of this controversy is not .an overj:-;:-;u<' of stoek and rouJd ,·alidi~- be issued by the corporation :-;o it wa~ not void.

r,,,)(l

<':l~t'

or HaJikcr . .:· Tnu-;f

COJJI])(IJ.',lf

of Des

~~Joines

JV. N. Bood. ------ lowa ------· :233 X.,Y. ID-1-. 73 ~l.L.R.
1-1-21, involvPd an ad ion hy the pledgee of stork against
t h0 <'orporat ion for transfer of the stock to plaintiff on
P.
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the books of the corporation. The corporation defended
that it had not received consideration for the stock in the
amount of par value thereof, so the stock was void under
Iowa statute that required receipt of par value for the
stock before issuance. The court in holding plaintiff to
be a transferee for value in good faith and without notice
of any infirmity in the stock held it w.as entitled to have
the stock transferred on its books. This case and the
annotation at 73 A.L.R. 1435 comprehensively covers
the matter of rights of the corporation and bona fide
purchasers in cases involving want of statutory consideration for its issuance. Although the Nevada Compiled
Laws, Section 1611 makes the judgment of directors as
to the value of labor, services or property received for
the issuance of stock conclusive in the absence of fraud,
so the impediment in the cases annotated does not arise,
the holdings of these cases are beneficial in considering
this c.ase. It is difficult to see how the plaintiff could be
bound by the principle of res judicata when he was not
a party to the action and, further, it should be noted that
no evidence has been adduced indicating that the plaintiff had knowledge of the action.
POINT II.
PLAINTIFF IS A BONA FIDE PURCHASER OF THE
STOCK FOR VALUE AND WITHOUT NOTICE OF ANY
INFIRMITY IN HIS TRANSFEROR'S TITLE.

The trial court specifically found that viaintiff purchased the stock in defendant corporation in good faith,
for value and without notice of any infirmity in his
transferor's title (R. 76).
15

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

This court in the case of Stanley v. Stanley, 97 U.
520, 94 P. 2d 465 and 466, laid down the following rule
with respect to the appellate review of the findings of
the trial court in equity cases as follows:
"The scope of the review on appeal in equity
cases is clearly settled in this jurisdiction. 'The
court is authorized by the State Constitution to
review the findings of the trial courts in equity
cases, but the findings of the trial courts on conflicting evidence will not be set aside unless it
manifestly appears that the court has misapplied
proven facts or made findings clearly against the
weight of proven facts or made findings clearly
against the weight of the evidence.' Oliver v.
Eleganti, 61 Utah 475, 214 P. 313, 315."
This case has perhaps become the leading case in
Utah on this point and is cited consistently as controlling.
Youngren r. King, 267 P. 2d 913. Perry r. McConkie,
264 p. 2d 853, 854.
A review of the record in the present case reveals
no substantial conflict of fact. The testimony of the
defendant~· witnesses does not differ in any material
respect from the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. Defendants' onl~· contention is that the testin1ony of their
own witnesses and of the plaintiff is not worthy of belief,
and that tht' trial court should have disregarded all of
the evidence presented by both parties .and ruled in defendants' favor.
Defendants took the depositions of both ~Iessrs.
Low<> and Cuthbert prior to trial (R. 53). In the trial
thp~· wen' called as defendants' witnesses and defendants
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did not claim any surprise at their testimony nor were
they examined as hostile witnesses. Appellants in their
brief do not claim .any surprise at the testimony, but
argue only that the testimony of the witnesses is not
worthy of belief.
In the case of Schlatter v. McCarthy, 113 U. 543, 196
P. 2d 968, 975, this court said:
"It is the general rule that a party who calls
a witness vouches for his veracity and cannot
afterwards impeach the witness, either by the
testimony of impe.aching witnesses or by argument to the jury. The rule is subject to some exceptions, notably where one party must call the
adverse party as a witness .... On the other hand,
a party who has called a witness to help prove his
case, and has vouched for his credibility may not
thereafter argue to the jury that such witness is
unworthy of belief."
The evidence in this action is undisputed that plaintiff had no actual notice of .any infirmity in the title of
Migliaccio to the stock. Appellants argue now that
Messrs. Cuthbert and Lowe were the agents of the plaintiff and of the sellers, citing the general proposition
that knowledge of .an agent is imputed to his principal.
Examination of the transaction clearly indicates they
were not agents of the plaintiff.
Here, Messrs. Cuthbert and Lowe knew both plaintiff and Migliaccio and knew that :Migliaccio held the
stock. They knew plaintiff wanted to invest in ur.anium
stocks, and so knowing told plaintiff of the stock and
arranged a meeting between plaintiff and Migliaccio

17
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where the sale was actually consummated. The plaintiff
and Migliaccio acted for themselves in making the sale
without the use of agents. The relationship of agency
between plaintiff and Messrs. Cuthbert and Lowe never
arose, so plaintiff could not be bound by their knowledge.
Assu1ning, for the purpose of argument, that an
agency agreement existed between plaintiff and :Messrs.
Cuthbert and Lowe, it should be noted that there is no
evidence that ~1essrs. Cuthbert and Lowe had at the time
of the transaction herein involved any knowledge of any
defect in the title to the stock certificate. To the contrary,
they had successfully defended the title to the stock certificate before the Securities Commission. Further, if they
had any knowledge of a defect in title, such knowledge
would have been acquired prior to the time any agency
arrangement arose between the plaintiff and :Messrs.
Cuthbert and Lowe and while in fact they were agents
of and representing another party and the general rule
governing such a situation is that previously acquired
knowledge of an agent is not imputed to the principal,
especially where the agent owes an obligation to another
not to connnunieate the fact~ that have con1e to his knowledge.
:2 A1n . •Tur.

~9-t..

See. 376, states the following:

.. The rule charging the principal with preaequired knowledge of his agent 1nay be
limited hy the f.act that the knowledge was acquired \Yhile arting for another principal where
duties to that prineipal still exist. or by the general execption that the principal is not chargeable with knowledge of his agent which he is
vious}~·
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under a duty not to disclose. It may thus result
that a principal will be held not chargeable with
the previously .acquired knowledge of his agent
in a particular case because of the fact that the
knowledge was acquired in transacting business
for another client or by way of a confidential communication, and not because it w.as acquired previously to the agency although that was the fact.
:Moreover, if the agent in good faith believes that
knowledge acquired prior to the agency is immaterial, it is not imputed to the principal."
Appellants in their brief have made quite an issue
of the fact that Messrs. Lowe and Cuthbert may be the
agents of the plaintiff. In relation to this question, I
should like to bring the court's attention to the fact that
the defendants and appellants did not plead the matter of
agency, nor direct an issue to such matter in their pleadings or argument, the matter of an agent's knowledge being imputed to the principal logically follows as an affirmative defense and under Rule 8 (c), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, must be set forth in the pleadings.
Defendants argue that plaintiff did not purchase the
stock in good f.aith, based upon the fact that the stock
was purchased considerably below its book value. There
was no promise of any profit whatsoever. He was told
that the stock of defendant corporation was not traded
on any market, and that the company had not operated
for approximately five years. The book value quoted
to him was at most that which he could receive if the
corporation was dissolved and the assets liquidated.
The testimony of Mr. Frawley demonstrates the attendant risks of this means of valuation. The officers of a

19
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corporation can fritter away the assets of a corporation
in no time at all, as, for example, the 100,000 shares of
Consolidated Uranium Mines Inc., stock held by defendant corporation were apparently dissipated. If the fact
that a stock is purchased substantially below its book
value were to put a purchaser on a duty to inquire as to
the title of his sellers, woe unto the purchasers of many
of the stocks currently traded daily on the New York
Stock Exchange. Further, it is relevant to note that the
uranium boom was at its height at the time this stock
was purchased and there was little or no relation between
market value and actual value of the stocks. In fact, in
the discussion, the book value of the subject stock was
determined by prorating an inflated market value of
speculative uranium stock (Consolidated U raniurn Mines,
Inc.) among units of the defendant company's stock
outstanding.
Through hindsight it can be seen that the book value
of the company at the time this purchase was made was
not the amount stated so any inquiry which plaintiff
might have n1ade would have shown him that the book
value was perhaps not even the amount paid, which certainly would not give ri8e to any inquiry as to the seller's title.
Plaintiff purchased the stock in question in good
faith as a uraniun1 speculation, believing that the stock
n1ight at smne tirne in the future develop into something
of substantial value where the stock could be sold for a
gain or a dissolution of the corporation be obtained
where he 1night realize a gain on his investn1ent.
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Appellants seeks to cloud the issue by their attempt
to impute constructive notice of a fact which was only
established at a much later date in a trial of defendants'
transferor's title in the courts. Plaintiff had no actual
notice of any defect, and certainly under the facts in this
case there can be no constructive notice imputed to him.
The plaintiff is not required to examine the books
of the corporation to determine whether or not any adverse clai1n to the stock was asserted. Brown v. Wright,
48 U. 633, 161 P. 448.
The record in this case discloses that demand was
made for transfer of the stock certificate on three sep.arate occasions and that the defendants refused to transfer said certificate (R. 6, R. 31, Lines 3 to 9, Inc.). Although the transfer was refused in each event, there is no
evidence indicating that the defendants informed the
plaintiff of their reasons for refus.al except as is stated
in the testimony as follows (R. 40,41) :

"Q. What did he say to

you~

"A. After he belabored me with invective
he told me he would not transfer the shares.

"Q.

Did he tell you

why~

"A. I don't know. He was cursing and
swearing so much I couldn't find .any coherence
to his conversation. He said it was fraud and I
was a fraud and the person I bought it from was
a fraud. He talked on for some number of minutes
and I was thoroughly disgusted with the conversation.

"Q. I gather you .at least knew there was
was something wrong~

21
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"A. I certainly did."
For the first at the trial of this case the defendants
claimed that the transferor did not have title to the
stock certificate. This defense was not given at the time
of refusal to transfer and plaintiff therefore contends
that such a defense cannot be raised at the time of trial
and is barred. The law on this matter is very well established and is best set forth in the Idaho case Hulse v.
Consolidated Quicksilver Mining Corporation, 65 Idaho
768, 154 P. 2d 149 wherein the court states as follows:
"It will also be noted that the grounds of
refusal to transfer the certificate were stated at
or about the time of the refusal thereof by the
corporation, and were not the grounds that it
now asserts for its refusal to transfer the stock.
"The rule has long been established in this
state that a corporation which refuses to transfer
stock upon its books must give at the time its
reasons for such refusal, and any reasons not so
given are waiYed. and a defense not asserted at
the tune of refusal to transfer cannot be raised
in the first instance at the time of trial of the
case."

POIXT III.
PLAINTIFF BY THE PURCHASE OF THE STOCK ACQUIRED AN INDEFEASIBLE RIGHT TO THE SHARES
REPRESENTED BY THE CERTIFICATE.

A p]wllant~ in their brief refer to a portion of Sec.
1617, N<>vada Cmnpiled Ltnn~ 1929 as a1nended. Their
a~~mnption tltat Xevada Law applies in this case is open
to ~Primi~ doubt. See Direction Der Discouto-GesellShaft v. l '. B. Sf('cl Corporation, 267 lT. S. 22, -t51S.Ct.
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207, 69 L. Ed. 495; Strout v. Burgess, 144 Me. 263, 68 A.
2d, 241 12 A.L.R. (2d) 939, 949. Beale in his Treatise
on the Conflict of Laws, Sec. 192.5 says :
"The question of who are shareholders in a
corporation is clearly a question of the internal
management of the corporation and is therefore
not to be determined by a foreign state. But the
share is evidenced by a certificate issued by the
corporation to certify that the person therein
named is a stockholder on the books of the corporation. By business practice this certificate is
treated as the tangible representative of the stock
and the owner of the certificate is entitled to be
registered on the books of the corporation. If this
certificate happens to be in the foreign state and is
there transferred, the law of that state must determine the title to the certificate though it cannot
determine the title to the share. The foreign
state having determined the title to the certificate,
the title to the share follows as a matter of
course."
However, it is submitted that a determination of the
conflicts of law question is not necessary in this matter
in that the laws of Utah and Nevada are the same.
Sec. 1617 of the Nevada Compiled Laws, 1928, as
amended h? Stats. 1937, 10. (Nevada Compiled L.aws
1931-1941 Supplement), quoted in part in appellant's
brief reads as follows:
"Sec. 18. * * * The shares of stock in every
corporation shall be personal property and shall
be transferable on the books of the corporation
in such manner .and under such regulations as
may be provided in the by laws. The delivery of
a certificate of stock in a corporation to a bona
23
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fide purchaser or pledgee, for value, together
with a written transfer of the same, or a written
power of attorney to sell, assign and transfer
the same, signed by the owner of the certificate,
shall be a sufficient delivery to transfer the title
against all parties except the corporation. No
transfer of stock shall be valid against the corporation until it shall have been registered upon the
books of the corporation."
This was the law in X evada dealing with the transfer
of stock until 1945 when Nevada enacted the Uniform
Stock Transfer Act. (Sections 1854 to 1854.23, Nevada
Compiled Laws, Supplement 1943-1949).
Section 24 of the Act (Sec. 1854.22 N. C. L.) provides:
"All acts or parts of acts inconsistent with
this act are hereby repealed."
Sec. 19 of the Act (Sec. 1854.18 X. C. L.) states:
"This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make
uniform the law of those states which enact it."

An exmuination of the above quoted provisions of
Section 1617 in the light of enacted provisions of the
Unifonn Aet leads one to the inescapable conclusion that
this portion of Section 1617 has been repealed by the
later enacbnent.
The fi r~t and third ~entences of the above quoted
port ion~ of ~Petion 1617 have been superceded b)"'" the
last paragraph of Section 1 of the Act (Section 1854,
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N. C. L. which is identical to 16-3-1, Utah Code Annotated,
1953) and which reads as follows:

"The provisions of this section shall be applicable although the charter or articles of incorporation or code of regulations or by laws of
the corporation issuing the certificate and the
certificate itself provide that the shares represented thereby shall be transferable only on the
books of the corporation or shall be registered
by a registrar or transferred by a transfer agent."
The portion of Section 1617 quoted in appellants'
brief is superceded by Section 3 of the Act (Section
1854.02 N. C. L. which is identical with the first two
subsections of Section 16-3-3, Utah Code Annotated 1953)
which provides :
"Nothing in this act shall be construed as
forbidding .a corporation ...
" (a) To recognize the exclusive right of a
person registered on its books as the owner of
shares to receive dividends, and to vote as such
owner; or
"(b) To hold liable for all calls and assessments a person registered on its books as the
owner of shares."
The second sentence of Section 1617 quoted above,
1s superceded by Sections 1 (1854, N. C. L., which is
identical with Section 16-3-1 U. C. A. 1953), Section 5
(1854.04 N. C. L. which is identical with Section 16-3-5,
U. C. A. 1953), Section 6 (Section 1854.05 N. C. L. which
is identical with Section 16-3-6, U. C. A. 1953), Section
7 {Section 1854.06 N.C. L., which is identic.al with Section
25
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16-3-7, U. C. A. 1953) and Section 8 (Section 1854.07,
N. C. L. which is identical with Section 16-3-8, U. C. A.
1953).
The portion of Section 1617 on which appellants
contend the corporation's rights are not effected is that
which excepts the corporation. Even if the Uniform Act
had not repealed this section, the clear intent of this
exception is the same as the exception which is made by
Section 3 of the Uniform Act quoted above, namely, to
protect the corporation in the matter of voting dividends .and assessments. The X evada Supreme Court
has so construed the section in the case of Double 0.
Mining Co., v. Simrak, 132 P.2d 605, cited in appellants'
brief, where the court in discussing Section 1611, X. C. L.
said at page 606 :

"* * * Primarily, the enactment of Section
1617, N. C. L., was to provide protection to the
officers of a corporation in determining the ownership of or right to vote shares of stock. It readily
appears that under certain circumstances corporation officials would be confronted with conflicting claims of ownership and the right to vote
shares of stock and thus long delays or periods
of uncertainty result so the law has wisely provided, since a nonjudicial body such as the officers
of a corporation .are not equipped with the power
to n1ake a judicial detennination of conflicting
claims, that they haYe a right to rely upon the
records in finding who has the right to vote. * * * "
Section S of the Unifonn Art (1854.07, X. C. L., and
16-3-8, lltah Code Annotated 1953) provides:
"Although the transfer of a certificate or of
shares represented thereby has been rescinded or
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set aside, nevertheless, if the transferee has possession of the certificate or of a new certificate
representing part or the whole of the same shares
of stock, a subsequent transfer of such certificate
by the transferee, rnediately or immediately, to
a purchaser for v.alue in good faith, without notice
of any facts making the transfer wrongful, shall
give such purchaser an indefeasible right to the
certificate and the shares represented thereby."
This section resolves the matters raised by appellants' Brief Points I and II.
As to the point that plaintiff is bound by the adjudication in the Federal Court proceeding, it is well
to note that this section gives a bona fide purchaser for
value without notice an "indefeasible right" to the shares,
even though the transfer of shares "has been rescinded
or set aside" and whether the transfer was made "mediately or immediately." Appellants' contention is contrary to the clear intent of this statute.
POINT IV.
PLAINTIFF IS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES.

vVithout question, plaintiff was entitled to have the
stock certificate transferred to his name on June 18,
1954, when dmnand was made upon the corporation for
the transfer of the certificate. Since that date plaintiff
has been deprived of his rights as a stockholder of said
corporation, including the rights of a stockholder to investigate the affairs of the corporation, examine its
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books, attend meetings and all of the other rights incident to a stockholder.
These rights have been deprived the plaintiff by
reason of the unwarranted refusal of the defendant
corporation and specifically of its president the defendant E. G. Frawley to transfer the certificate. Most certainly the court can take note of the fact that the plaintiff
has been put to considerable expense in order to force
the accomplishment of the act, to-wit, the transfer of the
stock certificate.
In addition, the evidence in this case clearly indicates
that the stock had a value at the time plaintiff purchased
the stock and for some time thereafter, specifically to
October 7, 1954, at which time the defendant Frawley,
an adverse witness and the person most intimately
acquainted with the values of the stock testified that the
stock was worth at least $4,000.00 (R.67), and whereas
this same party's testimony indicates that the stock
presently has no value (R.68, Lines 26, 27. 28):

"Q. The circu1nstances have changed, therefore the stock is valueless at this point?
"A. That is right."
These staten1ents are adlnissions against interest of
the defendant corporation and its president, are not contradicted in evidence by an~- other testimony. and therefore must giYP weight in detennining da1nages incurred
h~T thP plaintiff.
The tPxt :-;tatement contained in Fletcher Cyclopedia
Corporation:-;, Penuanent Edition, Yol. 12. Pages 4:21-2,
is as follows :
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"The measure of damages depends on the
nature of the action. If the plaintiff sues in conversion he is entitled to recover the value of the
stock, as in other cases of conversion. But if he
claims special damages only and seeks to retain
the stock, he cannot recover its value. And the
burden is upon him to establish the amount of
such special interest. This is true, for example,
where he does not sue in trover but brings action
on the case, and under such circumstances if he
does not prove any special damages he can recover nominal damages only."
The case of K ingsbttrg v. Riverton - Wyoming Refining Co., 68 Colo. 581, 192 P. 503, involved an action
for damages for failure to transfer stock of the defendant corporation owned by the plaintiff. Referring to the
matter of damages, the court states as follows:
". . . The shares were the property of the
plaintiff, and refusal to transfer them on his request was a violation of his rights. Such refusal
has been held a conversion. Gorham v. Massillion
S. & I. Co., ... 120 NE 467. The plaintiff was
entitled, in any event, to nominal damages. The
finding against him on that issue was error."
CONCLUSION

A review of the entire proceedings of the law in
relation thereto shows that the evidence undisputably
supports the trial court's determination that plaintiff
was a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of
any infirmity and is entitled to the transfer of the stock
certificate in question. Further, the defenses asserted
at the time of trial were not asserted at the time plaintiff
29

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

demanded transfer of the stock and, therefore, are
barred.
With relation to defendant's contention of agency,
there is no proof of agency or that the purported agents
had any knowledge of any infirmity that could be imputed to the plaintiff and, therefore, it is respectfully
submitted that the judgment of the trial court in this
respect be affirmed and that plaintiff be awarded damages.

IRVING H. BIELE
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
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